### **Defendable Products**

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### Agenda

- Background (Cybersecurity program)
- Guiding principles
- Implementation and roll out
- Lessons learned



### Schibsted tech in numbers

- 1 000+ Developers spread across 150+ teams
- 10 000+ Git repositories
- "All" programming languages in use
- 500+ Cloud accounts (AWS + GCP)
- 100+ Kubernetes clusters
- 51 879 Domains and subdomains

### Vulcan

- Infrastructure security scanner (unauthenticated)
- Teams, members and assets
- Self managed
- Open source







CYBER SECURITY ROADMAP	2020	2021	2022
Program stream			
Infrastructure stream			
Application stream	Inventory + Secure by default + Application Security + Cloud Security + Threat modelling + Training		
Operations stream			
Change stream			





### **Guiding Principles**



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### There is no technical silver bullet for product security

Teams need to be aware of the risks, then get empowered to improve security through training and tools.



### GitHub

Integrate security with the team's current workflow

Appropriate level of requirements and alerts



Be non-intrusive



#### Get high adoption through easy to use tools

#### Easy to operate / non-intrusive

Hard to operate / intrusive









Product teams will be provided a base to build upon

#### Security in the SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle)





### Shared k8s: Shared responsibility model

Product	Cloud (AWS)				
Product Teams	Central infra + Security	Cloud (AWS)			

### **Golden path security improvements**

AWS Kubernetes (AWS EKS) hardening

- AWS Bottlerocket as host OS: Security & k8s focused OS
- Audit capability for Schibsted's Security team
- GuardDuty for EKS Protection
- Run auditing tool Kubescape periodically to detect security issues
- Limit network access by deploying Cilium (network isolation, prevent spoofing, ++)
- IP allow listing by default
- WAF and DDoS protection preconfigured with a on/off toggle



### What we bought of security capabilities



## **Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)**





RAPID

# rietsparker

# \$

# Detectify

- Good UX
- Low false positives
- Quality findings
- Crowdsourcing model
  - Quick to add checks e.g. Log4Shell and Spring4Shell



### **AWS GuardDuty**

Easy to roll out centrally to 400+ AWS accounts Identifies basic misconfigurations (i.e. public S3 buckets) Detects breaches Low false positives

Great ROI! (~1% AWS spend)







## **Static Application Security Testing (SAST)**

Identify insecure code before it is deployed to production, preventing potentially exposing our systems and data to attackers.









### SAST solution: GitHub Advanced Security

#### **Great Developer experience/UX**

- Embedded into existing developer workflows!
- All vulnerability details and data flow analysis accessible inline in Pull requests, No need to leave GitHub for more details
- We can write our own custom checks with CodeQL



Helps developers directly in Pull request

### **GitHub Advanced Security**

CodeQL scanning finds security holes in your code (SARIF format)



Dependabot detects dependencies with security problems



Secret scanning looks for checked-in secrets 23 + router.get('/verify', async (reg, res) => { const token = req.query.t; const user = await User.findOne({ token }); Code scanning Database query built from user-controlled sources Check failure on line 25 in server/apps/routes.auth.js This query depends on a user-provided value. Show more details Show paths Close V

dependabot (bot) commented 31 minutes ago

Bumps bower from 1.3.5 to 1.3.37

Vulnerabilities fixed Sourced from The Node Security Working Group.

Arbitrary File Write Through Archive Extraction attackers can write arbitrary files when a malicious archive is extracted.

Affected versions: <1.3.37

env

X

AWS\_ACCESS\_KEY\_ID="AKIAIOSFODNN6EXAMPLE"

AWS\_SECRET\_ACCESS\_KEY="wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCXEXAMPLEKEY"

Amazon AWS Secret Access Key

If this secret is valid, we recommend that you rotate it and then revoke it.

### **Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM)**

**Cloud misconfigurations** is the most common root cause for data breaches in the cloud. With a CSPM tool we can help to prevent those in all our cloud environments for all brands.



CSPM vendors evaluate in collaboration with FINN, News Media, Lendo, Developer Foundations and ETech.

### **CSPM vendor chosen: Wiz** Vulnerability with public exploit on server with External Exposure and High privileges

Differentiate actual critical findings from other less critical security issues.



### **Private Bug Bounty program**



# lackerone





## Private Bug Bounty program

- Platform: Intigriti
  - Reason: Cost + Norwegian community
- Currently run 6 private bug bounty programs
- ~1000 domains in scope across all programs
- 17 Critical findings since September 2022
- Share write-ups internally of the most interesting vulnerabilities
- Great Return of investment, highly recommended!





## Dependency Confusion issue in NPM package

#### Severity: Critical, Bug bounty: €1 000

Dependency confusion is a security issue that most package managers are affected by when using a internal registry like Artifactory. To understand more about the vulnerability class, please read the blog post How we protected ourselves from the Dependency Confusion attack.

#### Vulnerability details

### What money can't buy: Security culture

#### Defendable Products training package, over 1000 developers trained



### Sorry, we couldn't avoid it... we introduced...

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# Security policies

### **Policies**

This pages links to all the policies related to Product and Application Security.

- Static application security testing (SAST) Policy
- Dynamic application security testing (DAST) Policy
- Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) Policy
- Secret scanning Policy
- Software Composition Analysis Policy

### **SAST Policy**

#### Must

- The code repositories which are associated to the Products classified as Severe, Major or Moderate in a HARM assessment must be on-boarded to a SAST tool.
- The security of the Source Code is the brand/team's responsibility.
- The time to remediate the issues raised by SAST tool is tied to the HARM assessment and severity of the finding. See table below for remediation requirements.

Finding Criticality	HARM Impact Category	Required time (working days) to mitigation or accept risk
Critical	Severe	2 days
High	Severe	7 days
Medium	Severe	14 days
Critical	Major	5 days
High	Major	12 days
Medium	Major	21 days

### Cybersecurity program, did we reach our initial goal?



Level 3

### Mistakes were made

- Did not negotiate pricing above what we expected
  - Bad negotiation terms, extra approval round internally for extra budget
- Communicate communicate communicate!
  - Some information was not read by key stakeholders, so they caught by surprise with the rollout. Should have done multiple communications
- All tools was not available during the developer training
  - If you have time, roll out security tools/capabilities before doing developer training (we didn't have time to do this in the ideal order)

### **Plans going forward**

- Unified view of vulnerabilities (Vulcan)
- Optimise and tune all security tools
  - Tight timeline in program, so not enough time to tweak everything
- Automated Risk Scoring System
  - Tells teams what their next risk reducing activity should be
- Cloud Security: Deny certain high risky API's
- Launch Security Champion-ish program

# The end!

Please reach out! Let's collaborate and share! :)

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